by DWDun » Wed Sep 18, 2019 4:52 pm
HERE ARE A FEW PAGES OF DUMMY TEXT, GUARANTEED TO HAVE BEEN PRODUCED BY A DUMMY.I NOTICE THAT MY CENTERING ETC HAS BEEN DROPPED OUT AND IT DOES NOT T SHOW THE HEADERS, BLANK PAGES, OR ANYTHING ELSE THAT WOULD IDENTIFY IT AS OO LARGE DOCUMENT. GOOD LUCK WITH IT. THE BLANK PAGES ARE JUST LARGE BLANK PLACES
COMBAT SEARCH and RESCUE
That others may Live. Leave No Man Behind.
Copyright 2012, 2019
Don Dunaway
All Rights Reserved
Cover Art: USAF Photo
Originally Published Under The Title:
Another Side of That War
THE ONLY ONE REALLY WORTH FIGHTING FOR
CONTENTS
Dedication i
Acknowledgments ix
Author’s Foreword xiii
Introduction. . . . . . . . . .1
The Aircraft . . . . . . . . .11
Survival Training. . . . . .29
New Home. . . . . . . . . .43
First Mission. . . . . . . . . 51
Filling Squares . . . . . . .65
Watering Holes . . . . . . .73
THE Mission . . . . . . . . .91
The Firefly Mission. . . . .99
Time Out . . . . . . . . . . 123
Ground Crews. . . . . . . 131
First Rescue . . . . . . . . 139
RESCAP . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Odd Jobs . . . . . . . . . . 169
Tchepone . . . . . . . . . . 181
Missed One. . . . . . . . . 202
Tchepone, Again. . . . . .215
Sunrise Service. . . . . . .233
Missed Another One.. . .251
Go Kill Somethin' . . . . .261
Last Mission. . . . . . . . .269
Speaking Tour. . . . . . . .283
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . .291
Glossarium. . . . . . . . . .299
Index of Players . . . . . .329
It has long been said that military husbands should come with a Technical Manual fraught with Notes, Cautions and Warnings, like any other well regulated, well written Tech Order.
And much has been written about how those who stay behind while the husband does his military duty cope with the hardships, crises and stresses created by that separation. These familial splits are painful to all involved, but they are a necessary evil of the military system that knows no better way to accomplish the primary mission. And the Mission must of course always be the winning consideration. While the coping techniques take many different forms and enjoy varying degrees of success, any family that prevails in such an unpleasant ordeal cannot be praised too highly. In maintaining their family structure and identity, in doing well what is needful of doing in the day-to-day routine and, in the process they become an even more exemplary asset to their community and nation. They are deserving of any and all praise that might be directed their way.
So the result of this writing is dedicated to my family who stayed behind and persevered, coped and lived their lives as best they could under extremely trying circumstances. But it is dedicated especially to my son Dub who cared enough about it to insist that it be written. This is nothing more or less than my best answer to that timeless and eternally recurring question in every generation and every society; "What did you do in the war, daddy?"
As I begin I cannot but be mindful of the husbands and fathers of my own acquaintance, and the untold thousands I never met, who sacrificed all their tomorrows in answering their Nation’s call. As a result their families are forever barred the opportunity and satisfaction of hearing of their warrior’s achievements, their successes and failures, and their warrior’s perceptions of the horrors of the war they fought. I know my family would endorse and join with me in the dedication of the writing of this collection of narratives to the memory of those who can never, and it is with a profound sense of obligation, duty and gratitude that I commence the relating of my year of combat, June 1968 to June 1969, in THAT WAR, the Southeast Asian conflict.
Although I have exercised a modest amount of literary license, most of the named characters in this writing are not fictional. Many of them tried for and achieved varying degrees of anonymity. Some of them even attained a degree of invisibility which was usually corrected with a good night’s sleep; bur fictional was not one of their attributes.
It is with sincere gratitude for much-needed and un-stinting assistance that I acknowledge the generous help of the Brothers Bain.
Darrel is an accomplished author, savant, gentleman and scholar with two tours as a medic in THAT WAR, as well as a long list of published titles and other achievements on his resume. His expert guidance has proven to be priceless.
His younger (but not much) brother Gary Bain, Captain, USMC (Ret), whose rescue at Tchepone as Manual 42 I did not get in on, has three ejections from jet aircraft on his resume. His severe shortage of landings notwithstanding, his varied aviation experience, his wide knowledge and boundless enthusiasm, and his unimpeachable integrity and character continue to be treasured resources. He’s got me convinced that in his next life he wants to be a Sandy. He will be a good’un!
I would be remiss in the extreme if I did not also acknowledge the aid and inputs of my wife Barbra, my own in-house English and composition teacher. Her suggestions, critiques and encouragement have been more closely akin to lifesaving than to mere production-enhancement.
There are many good books relating various aspects of Combat Search and Rescue; scholarly, authoritative, thoroughly researched and well-written books of source material quality and as I am not quoting them I will refer to them no further. Reading any of them is highly recommended, not only for the captivating stories they tell but for a wider and better understanding of the technological advances that have been made to accomplish the mission at hand: the safe retrieval and return of aircrews from a hostile ground environment.
This writing is intended solely as a collection of narratives of my involvement in this worthy effort with references only to munitions, resources and tactics as needed for the telling of a particular story. It tries to capture the events, environment and emotions from the perspective of a human, a husband and father, and a hands-on fighter pilot. Some will disagree with my perceptions and memories and that’s okay; I would probably disagree with some of theirs as well. If the reader finds anything about it that might be considered scholarly or even approaching the literary, be not dismayed, it is purely accidental and will soon be corrected.
To explain some of my methodology; I find it expedient to italicize those instances meant to designate what passes for thought processes within a cockpit, or musings of one kind or another in that space between the earphones of a helmet. In other places italics are used simply to add emphasis where I think emphasis is called for. Bold text will mark the first reference to something expanded in the Glossary, but only to the first one.
If you, the reader, have no background in aviation matters, it might be a good idea for you to read the glossary first. Not only will this introduce you to some of the aviation jargon that is necessarily used
throughout the book, it will also give you a broad hint as to the primary method used throughout the book: which is TONGUE IN CHEEK.
Although some, but not much, allegiance to chronology is maintained as one narrative relates to the next, there is no story line or thread of continuity that runs between the narratives and each is sufficient unto itself. That should make it a good bathroom book, but even in that guise it should be read just like your first reader; left to right, top to bottom and front to back.
IN 1967 THE "VIETNAM WAR" had been dragging on, as wars tend to do when there is no interest in or intention of winning, for at least six years and President Lyndon Baines Johnson's half-vast and pretentious efforts to win it were proving to be painfully inadequate. It was obvious to anyone who cared to look, that in spite of posturing and protestations to the contrary, winning was not the uppermost thing on the collective mind in Washington D.C. They just wanted you to think it was.
THAT WAR was initially undertaken with the noblest of intentions; stop the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia and secure peace, freedom and democracy for the South Vietnamese people. But our national leaders, educated only in self-serving back-room politics rather than in the profession of arms, and paying much more attention to pollsters, protesters and news-anchors than their own generals, were not up to the task of even pseudo-generalship. Thus the micro-management and gross mismanagement by inept politicians and their even more inept political appointees, plus self-serving and obviously corrupt indigenous officials, had THAT WAR in such a chaotic quagmire that the only thing still honorably salvageable was personal conduct.
With the national leadership looking for a satisfactory political solution, the war continued to drag on and the nation’s blood and treasure continued to be prodigally expended. It bears repeating that our ground forces won every battle, took every objective, achieved every identified goal and given the go-ahead and resources to do so would have beaten back every advance by the opposing forces. But obviously we didn’t want to do that! For any who might take exception to such an assessment, I refer them back to the Glossary and ROE. Yeah, yeah, I know; it wasn’t their fault their effectiveness diminished sharply when they forted up in Firebases and quit trying to out-guerrilla the guerrillas. But that’s another story and I wouldn’t want the Army to think I was trying to tell them how to fight a ground war; or how any of them should interpret their own dog-eared copy of Von Clausewitz.
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